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1 Introduction
Classical scholars recommend that democratization and trade liberalization go hand in hand on
e¢ ciency grounds. Building on the point that international trade is e¢ ciency enhancing, Smith
(1776) argues that democracy helps to support harmonious international economic relations, of
which free international trade is a central pillar. However, more recent work in political science
has argued that democracy may also empower distributional coalitions with intense protectionist
interests, making higher levels of protectionism more likely (Rogowski 1989, Garrett 2000: 973).
Both possibilities have found support in empirical research (ORourke and Taylor 2007, Decker
and Lim 2009, Aidt and Gassebner 2010). Yet to the best of my knowledge there is no well-
accepted theoretical framework or set of basic results on the relationship between the form of
government (dictatorship or democracy), trade policy, and economic e¢ ciency.3
This papers rst contribution is to provide such a framework and to analyze its main
implications. Using this framework, we will be able to show that it is only when a ruling elite
own a relatively scarce factor that democratization can be expected to go hand in hand with
trade liberalization and an increase in economic e¢ ciency. When the elite own a relatively
abundant factor, the advice of classical scholars will go unheeded in that democratization will
be accompanied by an increase in protectionism. Hence the paper presents a clear testable
prediction as to when democratization can be expected to result in an increase, and when it
may actually result in a decrease, of economic e¢ ciency through resultant changes in trade
policy. A third possibility revealed by the framework is that the ruling elite may be able to use
trade policy to forestall democratization.
The papers second contribution, made possible by the new framework developed, is to
examine the trade-policy responses by dictatorial regimes to price shocks. Throughout history
the advent of price shocks, especially food price shocks, has been one of the main triggers of
unrest provoking challenges to dictatorships.4 Yet price shocks cannot be analyzed in most of
the models that endogenize the form of government since these tend to be based on single-
sector macro models and so have been overlooked in the prior literature. Since our model has
3 In their path-breaking work, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) do present a model of globalization and trade
liberalization which o¤ers important insights into some aspects of this relationship (see Chapter 10). But, since
globalization is exogenous in their model, they do not consider the choice by government over trade policy and
they do not consider the economic e¢ ciency implications.
4See Williamson (2012) for a review of the literature showing that commodity price volatility can adversely
a¤ect economic performance and provoke political instability.
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the underlying structure of an international trade model with two sectors, price shocks can be
analyzed in a natural way. Given that price shocks can be triggered by technology shocks, the
implication of technology shocks for political stability can and will be analyzed as well.5
The model that we will develop combines Mayers (1984) 2  2 Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O)
model of international trade and trade policy with Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000) model of
the form of government (henceforth AR). The AR framework is extended to provide a new
motivation for trade policy. But the AR framework, being a single-sector model, cannot be used
to consider economic e¢ ciency while the international trade policy framework features clear
e¢ ciency implications. Thus, the combination of these two models extends each in a non-trivial
way to provide a new political-economy model of trade policy-making, which yields new insights
that would not be available from either of the original models on their own.
The underlying economic model is of a country at a relatively early stage of development.
Accordingly, there are two productive factors: labor and land. There are two groups within
society: the elite and the rest of society. The term eliteis used to represent an old regime elite
such as a landed aristocracy. The rest of societyencompasses the working class and possibly
an emerging industrial middle class. In the stylized setting of a two-factor two-good model,
we will assume that both groups own labor but only the elite own land. This is a reasonable
assumption for a less developed country, where factor ownership tends to be highly polarized
and factor markets poorly functioning. Since the underlying production structure is given by
the H-O model, the standard results of new classical trade theory apply. As predicted by the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the owners of the abundant factor prefer a relatively open trade
regime while the owners of the scarce factor prefer a regime that is more protectionist. We will
consider situations where land is the abundant factor and the scarce factor respectively.
In seeking to isolate the relationship between the form of government, trade policy, and
economic e¢ ciency in the face of price shocks, we will assume that a trade tax is the only
policy instrument available. This assumption has rm foundations in the data in two respects.
First, countries at an early stage of development tend not to invest in domestic scal capacity.
As Besley and Persson (2011: 41-43) state: Arguably, trade taxes and income taxes are two
5The framework introduced in this paper focuses on a situation where world price shocks are permanent, which
seems reasonable when the underlying forces driving the shocks are permanent such as technological innovation.
The model could be extended to consider other situations where world price shocks are temporary, such as crop
failures arising from extreme weather events. We will discuss this possibility in the concluding section.
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polar opposite cases. To collect trade taxes requires being able to observe trade ows at major
shipping ports. Although such tax allocations may encourage smuggling, it is a much easier
proposition than collecting income taxes. The latter requires major investments in enforcement
and compliance structures throughout the economy. ... High-income countries tend to depend
more on income taxes, whereas middle- and, in particular low-income countries depend more on
trade taxes.The second reason is that, to the extent that domestic scal capacity is installed,
it tends not to be used for progressively redistributive purposes until after extension of the
franchise. Aidt and Jensen (2009) show this in the data for a sample of ten Western European
countries covering the period 1860-1938. Since our focus is on a country at the relatively early
stages of development, that has not yet extended the franchise, it seems reasonable to assume in
our stylized characterization that there is no domestic scal capacity and that only trade taxes
are available.6
Reviewing the papers rst contribution, it shows how trade policy can be used to resolve
a commitment problem that the elite face under the threat of revolution. AR argue that the
elites purpose in extending the voting franchise is to resolve a commitment problem that they
face under the threat of revolution. The commitment problem arises if the elite cannot make
su¢ ciently large transfers, within a single period, to compensate the rest of society for the gains
that they would enjoy from a revolution. If transfers must be made over multiple periods, and
if the threat of revolution may dissipate prior to the transfers being completed, then the elite
will not be able to credibly commit to transfers large enough to defuse the threat of revolution.
By extending the franchise, the elite transfer power to set taxes to the rest of society, and thus
democratization makes a credible commitment to su¢ ciently large transfers. Domestic lump-
sum redistributive taxation is the policy instrument used in ARs framework. But the literature
cited above argues that domestic scal capacity did not exist for such redistribution prior to
extension of the franchise. The present paper identies the circumstances under which trade
taxes, the capacity for which did exist prior to extension of the franchise, could be used to make
such redistributions and hence resolve the commitment problem.
Since the elite would always prefer to retain power (including the power to set trade taxes)
rather than extend the franchise, the paper also provides a way to think about when the elite can
6Prior to extension of the franchise, in addition to trade taxes, other types of taxation such as excise taxes
were used to fund public good provision, especially defense. But, unlike trade taxes, excise taxes tend not to
imply progressive redistribution so we will leave them aside as well.
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use trade policy to forestall democratization. As an alternative to extending the franchise, the
elite may be able to neutralize the threat of revolution and forestall democratization by making
temporary concessions to the rest of society over trade policy, thus using trade policy to maintain
their grip on power. We will refer to the price level arising from a trade policy concession that
is implemented to defuse a revolutionary threat and maintain the political status quo as the
status quo price. From our framework we will be able to delineate precisely where the elite
face a commitment problem and hence must extend the franchise, and where they do not face a
commitment problem and hence can use trade policy to forestall democratization.
Characterization of equilibrium lies at the heart of the papers rst contribution. This
determines the conditions when the elite have to extend the franchise in order to defuse a revo-
lutionary threat or alternatively when they can forestall democratization by adopting the status
quo price. It also determines when trade liberalization goes hand in hand with democratization
and when democratization will be accompanied by an increase in protectionism. If the rest of
society own the relatively abundant factor then, since the median voter is a member of the rest
of society, democratization will be accompanied by trade liberalization. However, if they own
the relatively scarce factor then democratization will be accompanied by an increase in protec-
tionism. If the elite can use trade policy to forestall democratization, then we will nd that
the status quo price concedes greater openness if the rest of society own the abundant factor
and greater protection if they own the scarce factor. It may be implemented by import tari¤s
and/or export taxes that lie between autarky and free trade.
As mentioned above, this paper provides a framework in which the e¢ ciency implications
of democratization can be examined. If the rest of society own the relatively abundant factor
and democratization is accompanied by trade liberalization then democratization will involve an
increase in economic e¢ ciency. It is when the rest of society own the relatively scarce factor that
democratization will lead to an increase in protection and a reduction in economic e¢ ciency.
The main insight from this aspect of the analysis is that any consideration of the e¢ ciency
implications of democratization must take comparative advantage and factor ownership into
account. This insight may be useful in framing future empirical investigations.
Placing the papers rst contribution, the majority of the previous literature on institutions
and economic e¢ ciency has focused on the role not of political but of economic institutions
in the determination of economic performance. Following North (1981), the main focus of
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attention has been on economic institutions that dene and enforce contracts and property
rights, although the regulation of entry, nancial markets, technology and scal capacity are also
regarded as important (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, e.g. 1997, Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, e.g. 2001, Rodrik, e.g. 2007, Besley and Persson e.g. 2011). This
macroeconomic institutions literature has shown that countries with better rule of law and
more private property rights have on average grown faster, where faster growth is associated with
better allocative e¢ ciency. At the same time, Besley and Jayaraman (2010) point out that  ...
there is clearly a great deal of heterogeneity in institutions as well as in outcomes associated with
a given institutional metric.The literature on the interaction between economic institutions
and international trade provides some insight into how such heterogeneity can arise. It does
so by arguing that poor institutions can be a source of rent for some groups while institutions
can also be a source of comparative advantage. Consequently, the welfare consequences arising
from the interaction between economic institutions and international trade are shown to be
ambiguous (Engerman and Sokolo¤ 1997, Levchenko 2007, 2013, Nunn 2007, Costinot 2009).
The present paper, by focusing on the interaction between political institutions and economic
e¢ ciency, shows how there can be a heterogeneity of e¢ ciency outcomes associated with the
institution of democracy. Furthermore it shows that this heterogeneity depends systematically
on the endogenous interaction between comparative advantage and underlying factor ownership.
Turning to the papers second contribution, in examining trade-policy responses by dicta-
torial regimes to price shocks, our framework opens the door to a deeper understanding of how
trade policy evolved during an interesting episode of history. The episode concerns the evolution
of British trade policy during the period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the
eventual repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. A great deal of research has focused on Britains
repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, when tari¤s of 7 percent were repealed to free trade. The
framework developed in this paper additionally makes it possible to understand the prior period
from 1815 until just before repeal (as well as repeal itself), during which tari¤s were reduced
from 70 percent to 7 percent. The explanation I propose is grounded in the fact that Britains
ruling elite owned land, used intensively to produce agriculture, while the country had a compar-
ative advantage in manufactures which at that time were labor intensive. So the elite preferred
a relatively closed regime, and at the end of the Napoleonic Wars put in place the Corn Laws
to protect the income they made from land. During the 1800s there was a transport revolution
that dramatically reduced the world prices of grain for importers such as Britain (ORourke
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and Williamson 1999: 33-36). The fall in prices made revolution more appealing to the rest of
society in Britain since if they were able to depose the elite regime they would adopt more open
trade policy, facilitating access to cheap grain from the world market. This in turn mandated a
gradual fall in the status quo price, which the elite brought about through trade liberalization.7
This account would not be complete without considering the other side of the grain market,
which was dominated by Prussia. Prussias aristocracy, like Britains, held their wealth in large
estates. But, di¤erently from Britain, Prussia had a comparative advantage in agricultural
products such as grain which Britain imported. As owners of the abundant factor, Prussias
elite enacted low tari¤s after the end of the Napoleonic wars, again di¤erently from Britain.
But as transport costs fell and world prices of grain rose, benetting exporters but putting
import-competing industries under pressure, the Prussian ruling elite came under pressure to
raise protectionism and did so steadily between 1815 and 1846 (Kindleberger 1975). The most
dramatic rise in protectionism came in 1847 when harvests failed throughout Europe and grain
prices rose sharply. In the face of hunger riotsin Prussia, export taxes on grain were raised
by 25 percent in an attempt to keep domestic grain prices from rising and thereby maintain the
status quo, as would be predicted by our model (Solar 1997).8
Placing the papers second contribution, most of the prior literature on trade policy focuses
on a stable institutional environment where democracy has already been consolidated. In that
literature, interest groups are able to lobby the government in order to try to inuence the
7 It may seem counterfactual to think of Britain as a dictatorship of the elite in the mid 19th Century when it
already had a democratically elected chamber in the Houses of Parliament called the House of Commons. Indeed,
much of the past literature on repeal of the Corn Laws focuses on lobbying by industrialists of the House of
Commons in classic Grossman-Helpman fashion. However, recent work by Schonhardt-Bailey draws attention to
the fact that at that time the unelected House of Lords, whose peers consisted of the landed aristocracy, held veto
power over any policy passed by the House of Commons. This in turn meant that the tension that drove repeal
was not so much between the industrialists and the House of Commons but more between the ordinary people who
threatened revolution and the House of Lords who would lose political and economic power if a revolution occurred
(Schonhardt-Bailey 2006: 2, 227). Research on British democratization prior to Schonhardt-Bailey has attributed
major signicance to Britains Representation of the People Act of 1832. While certainly an important advance
in the process of British democratization, in that it gave a greater number of seats in the House of Commons
to constituencies from northern industrial cities such as Manchester, Schonhardt-Bailey argues that the really
decisive step in Britains democratization was taken when the Lords veto was removed in the Representation
of the People Act of 1867. This view is endorsed by recent research in history; see for example Farrell (2010).
Further evidence in support of this view is presented in Appendix B.
8The 19th Century trade policy experiences of Britain and Prussia have not, to my knowledge, been linked
previously in general political-economic equilibrium. The forces driving policy in these two countries are identied
by the seminal work of Rogowski (1989). He invokes the logic of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to argue (non-
formally but drawing on a broad range of historical accounts) that the owners of abundant factors are likely to
organize politically and push for trade liberalization while owners of scarce factors are likely to resist it, possibly
resulting in the threat of a revolution. Unlike in the present paper he considers Britain and Prussia separately,
and does not link trade policy evolution in the two countries to changes in transport costs.
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electoral outcome, or sway policy in the direction they would like to see it go (Hillman 1982,
Hillman and Ursprung 1988, Grossman and Helpman 1994, Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Relating
to a di¤erent branch of that literature, the use of democratization in our model to commit to
a certain trade policy is similar to the commitment rationale for trade agreements espoused by
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998). When the institutional environment in practice is closer to
that characterized in the present paper, our model may be able to explain patterns in the data
that are more di¢ cult to explain using standard political economy models. Consider the decline
in transport costs in the rst half of the nineteenth century described above, that lead to a
decrease in protectionism in Britain but an increase in Prussia. In a Grossman-Helpman model
one would expect both countries to respond in the same way (either by increasing or reducing
protection) under the assumption of symmetrical political structures across countries, where the
government responded to organized interests in import-competing sectors. The di¤erence with
the model developed in this paper is that it provides an explanation of the di¤erent British and
Prussian reactions within a common model of the political constraints faced by governments.9
More generally, our approach opens the door to a consideration of how governments motivated
by a desire to preserve their power may respond di¤erently to common technology shocks based
on their di¤ering underlying fundamentals.
This paper complements a third branch of the literature that examines how political in-
stitutions are determined by strategic interaction between elite groups and the rest of society
(Lizzeri and Persico 2004, Llavador and Oxoby 2005, Jack and Laguno¤ 2006). Most closely
related to ours, Galiani and Torrens (2014) consider a framework where, in the face of the threat
of a revolution, power can be shifted to the elite group whose interests are most aligned with
those of workers. To defuse the threat of revolution, the elite can thus make a credible com-
mitment to adopt the trade policy stance that workers prefer, but maintain income tax policy
at a level that the elite would prefer. In all the papers of this third branch of the literature,
political institutions and policy changes are determined through a shift in the balance of power
between elite groups. By assuming only two groups, an elite and the rest of society, the present
paper deliberately abstracts from intra-elite interactions. It focuses instead on partial shifts in
9This paper also provides a new explanation for how trade policy can uctuate over time. Bagwell and Staiger
(1990, 2003) model uctuations in the level of protection over time but these arise as a result of temporary surges
in import demand, or variations in total demand over the business cycle. In the present paper, trade policy
uctuations come about through endogenous changes in the weights on the governments objective function. The
incorporation of temporary import demand uctuations into the framework of the present paper is a promising
area of future research that will be discussed further in the concluding section.
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trade policy in an attempt to forestall democratization. The papers in this third branch of the
literature cannot account for such partial shifts in trade policy because they do not have the
capacity to account for the trade policy revenue considerations. This capacity enables us to
examine incremental changes in trade policy over time, and is necessary to be able to carry out
comparative statics on trade policy and hence analyze world price shocks.10
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the economic model based around the
H-O model and uses this to characterize the levels of protectionism that would be preferred by
the elite and the rest of society respectively. Equilibrium is characterized in Section 3, using the
economic model of Section 2 to determine the payo¤s in a dynamic game, through which the form
of government and trade policy are determined. Section 4 examines the e¤ects of a permanent
world price shock on trade policy. Section 5 discusses these e¤ects in the light of the episodes
of 19th Century trade policy-making in Britain and Prussia introduced above. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 6. Proofs of results are presented in Appendix A where indicated; other proofs
are in the main text. Appendix B presents longer discussions of trade policy in Britain and
Prussia in the early 19th Century and provides further evidence of the t of these episodes to
the analytical framework. The appendices are available online.
2 The H-O Model with Trade Policy
The model is of a single small country, populated by a continuum of risk-neutral agents. Each
agent is placed in one of two groups: the elite, ", or the rest of society,. The mass of each
of these groups is normalized to  and 1 respectively so that the total mass of the population is
1 + . The elite constitutes a minority of the population:  < 1.
The model has an innite time horizon. A subscript-t denotes the time period t = 0; 1; :::;1.
The economy is endowed with two primary factors. One of these factors is labor, l, the endow-
ment 1+ of which is equally shared across the elite and the rest of society. For concreteness we
will refer to the other factor as land, , although this could equally be capital, the endowment
 of which is distributed evenly but solely among members of the elite. Let yjt denote agent js
10The present paper is also related to two others. Liu and Ornelas (2014) study the relationship between
participation in free trade agreements and the sustainability of democracy. Their model shows that free trade
agreements can critically reduce the incentive of authoritarian groups to seek power by destroying protectionist
rents, thus increasing the chances of democratic consolidation. Garnkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos(2008) work
is also related in that it considers the relationship between trade policy and political institutions, where their
focus is on the possibility of conict over a traded resource that can lead to civil war.
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factor income in period t, j 2 f"; g. Then a member of the elites factor income is given by
y"t = wt + rt, while a member of the rest of societys factor income is y

t = wt, where rt and wt
are the rental rate and wage in period t respectively. We will be interested in how aggregate
income is divided between the two groups as a result of changes in trade policy. So it will be
useful to know the factor income share jt for a member of each group:
jt = y
j
t =yt; (1)
where yt = (1 + )wt + rt is aggregate factor income. Given the measure of each group in the
population,
Z
jtdj = 
"
t + 

t = 1. All members of each group are identical to one another.
Each group di¤ers from the other only by its factor endowment.
2.1 Production
The economy is competitive, both in production and factor markets. Production of each good
requires both labor and land. Technology exhibits constant returns to scale and decreasing
returns to each factor. As standard in the H-O model, each good uses one of the factors
relatively intensively. There are two sectors, each producing a di¤erent homogenous commodity.
The goods are referred to as goods " and  respectively, reecting the fact that good " uses land
intensively which is owned by the elite, while good  uses labor intensively. There is free mobility
of (the xed aggregate supply of) each factor between sectors. This assumption underpins the
fact that there is a single factor price equated to the value of that factors marginal product.
Denote the price of good " relative to good  in period t by pt. Since the country is small, the
world price of good " relative to good , pw, is taken as given. It will also be helpful later to
have notation for the autarky price of good " relative to good : pa. This approach implies
that good  is the numeraire in the model. If the economy is open then goods may be traded
internationally but factors are not internationally mobile.
Output of good i 2 f"; g in period t is denoted by xit. There is free entry into both
sectors so that prots are driven to zero. Under these assumptions, given initial endowments,
population shares and production technology, outputs and factor prices are determined by pt,
so we may write wt = w (pt), rt = r (pt), and xit = xi (pt) in period t.11
11For compactness, where not relevant we will suppress the dependence of xit on factor endowments. This
dependency will become relevant when we discuss the cost of revolution.
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Since the structure of the economy is that of a standard 22 H-O model, the standard results
hold. We are particularly interested in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which demonstrates that
if, in a given period, pt is increased then the real rental rate unambiguously increases while the
real wage unambiguously decreases. Following Jones (1965), we can express the main implication
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem as follows:12
rt > p

t > 0 > w

t ;
where a superscript- on a variable denotes proportional change, e.g. rt = drt=rt. Given our
assumptions about endowments, we can translate this result into the e¤ects of price changes on
the incomes of the respective groups. But rst we must specify the redistributive implications
of trade policy, and to do that we must specify preferences.
2.2 Preferences
Agents j 2 f"; g have identical preferences and the same discount factor,  < 1. The expected
utility of agent j at time 0 is given by:
U j0 = E0
1X
t=0
tu

cj"t; c
j
t

where Et is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t. Utility
in each period is given by the function u

cj"t; c
j
t

, which is strictly quasi-concave in goods "
and  respectively. Tastes are identical and homothetic, giving rise to well-behaved demand
functions for agent j, cjit = c
j
i

pt; Y
j
t

, where Y jt is total income of agent j. Furthermore, by
homotheticity we may write cji

pt; Y
j
t

= ci (pt)Y
j
t .
13 We will denote aggregate demand for
good i by cit, where aggregate demand for good i is given by the function cit = ci (pt; Yt) and Yt
is aggregate income. Since all individuals have identical homothetic preferences, we may write
ci (pt; Yt) = ci (pt)Yt = ci (pt)Y
"
t + ci (pt)Y

t . These assumptions on consumer behavior will
help to establish the existence of well behaved optimal policies for each group.
12The conditions required for this relationship to hold globally are established by Chipman (1969) and the
literature to which he refers. These conditions are assumed to hold throughout our analysis.
13A formal denition of Y jt is provided below. For now note that it comprises factor income, y
j
t , and income
from trade policy which will be dened below. Also note that cjit depends on the parameter p
w via the e¤ect of
the world price on income. However, throughout the paper we will adopt the convention that parameters such as
pw are suppressed from general functional notation.
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2.3 Policy Instruments, Trade, and Income
We will restrict the set of policy instruments to trade taxes. In principle, our model allows
for a consideration of trade subsidies as well. But we will assume that there is no domestic
scal capacity and so trade subsidies are not feasible.14 Trade taxes drive a wedge between the
domestic price and the world price, both for consumers and for producers. For convenience, and
without loss of generality, we will assume that trade policy is applied to good ". Note that we
have not specied the countrys comparative advantage so good " could be either the countrys
exportable or its import-competing good. A domestic price in excess of the world price implies
an import tari¤ for a good that is imported (and an export subsidy for one that is exported).
A domestic price that is below the world price corresponds to an export tax for a good that is
exported (and an import subsidy for one that is imported).
Concerning the redistribution of trade policy revenue, we will follow Mayer (1984) in as-
suming that this is neutral with respect to the overall distribution of income. Neutrality implies
that agent js share of total policy revenue in period t is identical to agent js factor income
share in that period, as given by (1).15 So net trade policy revenue for an individual j in period
t, trjt , is given by
trjt = 
j
t  trt; (2)
where trt is aggregate trade policy revenue. Let mt = m (pt; Yt) = c" (pt)Yt   x" (pt), with mt
the quantity imported of good " in period t and m (pt; Yt) the corresponding import demand
function. Then trt = tr (pt) = (pt   pw)mt. Note that, in the absence of revenue for trade
subsidies, if the country has a comparative advantage in good  then m (pt; Yt)  0 and pt  pw
while if it has a comparative advantage in good " then m (pt; Yt)  0 and pt  pw.16 It follows
that trt  0.
14The assumption that domestic scal capacity is not available is intended to focus attention on trade policy
as the sole policy instrument for redistribution. The results do not depend on the fact that trade subsidies are
unavailable.
15This assumption plays essentially the same role as the more familiar assumption that tari¤ revenue is redis-
tributed in lump-sum. In both cases, the purpose is to neutralize the role of trade policy revenue redistribution
in the determination of group js optimal trade policy. However, Mayers neutrality assumption makes it clearer
ex ante how tari¤ revenue will be redistributed. A redistribution rule that deviates from neutrality tends to give
the group that gets a higher share of the revenue an interest in increasing the policy at the margin. An extreme
version of this rule would give all revenue to the elite. This would parallel AR in their closed-economy one-sector
setting, where the elite keep all tax revenue for themselves. Varying the share of trade policy revenue to the
respective groups would not change our results qualitatively, but would a¤ect the range of values of  for which
a revolution constraintbinds. See the discussion of the revolution constraint (15) below for details.
16Exports are denoted by negative imports.
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Finally, Yt, measured in terms of good , takes the form
Yt = (1 + )w (pt) + r (pt) + tr (pt) = ptx" (pt) + x (pt) + (pt   pw)mt: (3)
Under homothetic preferences, we can solve simultaneously for mt and Yt:
mt = m (pt) =
c" (pt) (ptx" (pt) + x (pt))  x" (pt)
1  (pt   pw) c" (pt) ; (4)
Yt = Y (pt) =
pwx" (pt) + x (pt)
1  (pt   pw) c" (pt) : (5)
Of course, 0 < c" (pt) < 1. By assumption for now, if pt > pw then (pt   pw) is su¢ ciently
small that (pt   pw) c" (pt) < 1. This will be true in equilibrium. These forms clarify that we
can express imports and total income strictly in terms of prices. Finally, we can dene the total
income of a member of group j, Y jt , as the sum of factor income and their share of trade policy
revenue. Use the denitions of y"t and y

t together with (1), (2), wt = w (pt) and rt = r (pt), to
write total income for a member of group j as17
Y jt = Y
j (pt) = 
j (pt)Y (pt) : (6)
Expression (6) shows that the total income for a member of each group can be written as a
product of aggregate income and a member of that groups income share, each term expressed
as a function of pt. This way of writing a member of each groups income will facilitate a clear
characterization of that groups preferred trade policy in terms of pt.
2.4 Welfare of Each Group and its Preferred Price Level
Using (6), the welfare of a member of group j 2 f"; g in period t can be measured using the
indirect utility function:
W jt = W
j
 
pt; Y
j (pt)

; j 2 f"; g : (7)
Adapting the approach developed by Mayer (1984) to the present context, each groups preferred
trade policy can be determined from (7) and expressed in terms of pt. Following this approach,
we will say that group js preferred price level, p^j , is the value of pt that maximizes W
j
t . The
17 In the following expressions we are dening the functions " (pt) and  (pt) by substituting the functions
wt = w (pt) and rt = r (pt) into the denitions of "t and 

t implied by (1).
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rst order condition from which p^j is obtained can be expressed as:18
focj (pt) =
dW jt
dpt
=
@W jt
@Y jt
 
j (pt) (pt   pw) @mt
@pt
+ Y (pt)
@jt
@pt
!
= 0: (8)
The rst term in the brackets represents the share borne by individual j of the aggregate
distortion resulting from protection: js distortion sharefor short. The second term in brackets
captures the redistributive Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect of trade policy on individual js factor
income: the Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect on jfor short. Assume that @2W jt =@p
2
t < 0, so that there
is a unique value, pt = p^j , that sets focj
 
p^j

= 0. Solving (8) for p^j :
p^j = pw   Y (pt)
@mt=@pt
@jt=@pt
j (pt)
; j 2 f"; g : (9)
The solution to p^j may imply a trade tax or trade subsidy. To fully understand this solution, we
will rst assume that the scal capacity exists to implement p^j as an interior solution. We will
then move on to consider the implementation of p^j in the absence of scal capacity, in which
case it may have to be implemented as a corner solution. Since Y (pt),  @mt=@pt, and j (pt)
are positive, the question of whether p^j lies above or below pw is determined solely by the sign
of @jt=@pt for " and  respectively. Di¤erentiating 
" (pt) and  (pt) in turn with respect to pt,
we obtain:
@"t
@pt
=
w (pt)  r (pt)
((1 + )w (pt) + r (pt))
2 pt

rt   wt
pt

> 0; (10)
@t
@pt
=     w (pt)  r (pt)
((1 + )w (pt) + r (pt))
2 pt

rt   wt
pt

< 0: (11)
Using these results with (9), we can conclude that p^" > pw > p^. For this solution to make
sense, we can always x pw su¢ ciently large that p^ > 0. Further discussion of how p^" and p^
are determined is provided in Appendix A.2.19
The relationship between the determination of p^" and p^ is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
With a comparative advantage in good ", pw > pa, as illustrated in Figure 1. The downward
18See Appendix A.1 for further details on how this rst order condition is derived. Since the solution for p^j is
obtained by nding the value of pt at which the expression inside the brackets is equal to zero, we do not strictly
need the term @W jt =@Y
j
t in foc
j (pt). However, later we will evaluate the e¤ect of a world price shock on p^j and,
in di¤erentiating focj (pt) with respect to pw, it will be necessary to incorporate the term @W
j
t =@Y
j
t .
19The driving force behind the results that @"t=@pt > 0 and @

t =@pt < 0 is the familiar Stolper-Samuelson
e¤ect. That is, the elite are relatively well endowed with land while the rest of society are relatively well endowed
with labor, so an increase in the relative price of the land-intensive good, pt, increases the income share of the
elite and reduces that of the rest of society. Thus agents in our model lie either side of the benchmark agent
introduced in Mayer (1984) whose factor endowments were equal to the average for the nation as a whole and
therefore whose factor income share would not change as a result of a change in pt.
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sloping lines show dW "t =dpt and dW

t =dpt, as given by (8). The point where each crosses the
horizontal axis determines p^" and p^ respectively, as given by (9). In this situation, the elites
welfare is maximized at a higher level of openness than is the rest of societys. This stands
to reason since, when the country has a comparative advantage in good ", the elite own the
factor used intensively in the production of the good for which the country has a comparative
advantage. Therefore, the elites factor income is increasing in the level of openness whereas
the rest of societys is decreasing. Indeed, since p^" > pw, the elite would ideally like an export
subsidy that increases the price received for each unit of good " above the world price. Under
our assumption that trade subsidies are not possible, the elite could do no better than to settle
for a corner solution at free trade, pw. Turning to p^, with Figure 1 being drawn in such a
way that p^ > pa, the interior solution implies that the rest of society would ideally like an
export tax on good " that allows some openness. But, depending on their relative preferences
for goods " and , it could equally be the case that p^ < pa. In that case, the rest of society
would ideally like an import subsidy on good " so large that it overturned the countrys natural
comparative advantage. But without the domestic scal capacity to raise the revenue required,
in this situation they could do no better than autarky.
With a comparative advantage in good , pa > pw, as illustrated in Figure 2. In that case
the rest of societys welfare is maximized at a higher level of openness than is the elites. With a
comparative advantage in good , it is the factor income of the rest of society that is increasing
in the level of openness, and so the rest of society prefers a higher level of openness in general.
And it is the preferred price level of the rest of society, p^ < pw, that would necessarily imply an
import subsidy if the domestic scal capacity were available to raise the revenue. In its absence,
the rest of society could do no better than to settle for free trade. As drawn in Figure 2, p^" < pa
is at an interior solution implying an import tari¤, but p^" > pa is equally feasible and would
imply an export subsidy on good " large enough to overturn the countrys natural comparative
advantage in good . But in the absence of domestic scal capacity, the elite could do no better
than to settle for autarky. This analysis is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. With domestic scal capacity available, p^ < pw < p^" regardless of comparative
advantage. If domestic scal capacity is absent then:
(i) with a comparative advantage in good ", p^" = pw while pa  p^ < pw;
(ii) with a comparative advantage in good , p^ = pw while pw < p^"  pa.
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From this result we can see that the level of openness preferred by the respective groups is
determined by which group owns the factor used intensively in the good for which the country
has a comparative advantage.20 Proposition 1 also reveals that the availability or otherwise of
domestic scal capacity for trade subsidies plays a role in the characterization of p^" and p^. We
will explain where relevant how equilibrium outcomes are a¤ected by an absence of domestic
scal capacity.
2.5 E¢ ciency
Following the utilitarian notion of e¢ ciency, we will use the total surplus available for distribution
to citizens in any given period, 
t:

t = u
 
c""t; c
"
t

+ u
 
c"t; c

t

: (12)
Appendix A.3 establishes that incremental trade liberalization is associated with an increase in
economic e¢ ciency. It is of course well known that, in a standard competitive trade model, free
trade maximizes e¢ ciency. In our model, di¤erently from the standard set-up, we rule out all
redistributive policy except for trade policy itself. We are also considering incremental changes
in trade policy rather than a move between autarky and free trade. So it may be helpful to know
that trade liberalization does imply an increase in e¢ ciency under these restrictions as well.
3 Trade Policy and the Form of Government
We will now endogenize pt by combining the H-O model set out above with the model of the
form of government developed by AR. Recall that our aim is to explore the role that trade
policy could play to defuse a revolution, both in terms of franchise extension and in terms of
forestalling democratization. To preview the framework that we will develop in terms of the
analysis so far, rst note that, with no threat of revolution, the elite will set their preferred trade
policy, p^". If the rest of society attain democracy, either through extension of the franchise or
through revolution, they are able to set the trade policy they would prefer in all periods, p^. The
elite would like to forestall democratization in order to avoid p^. To forestall democratization,
20The conict of interest between groups over trade policy is of course more general than the framework we
are using here. Our framework could be extended to consider any number of goods and factors. However, this
would obscure the simple logic of the revenue considerations of trade policy that we will be able to bring out in
the 2 2 case.
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the elite must use trade policy to make concessions to the rest of society so that their payo¤
from maintaining the status quo is at least as high as from revolution. But at the time they face
the threat of revolution, the elite may not be able to credibly commit to trade policy that makes
the rest of society at least as well o¤ as under revolution: the commitment problem. If they
cannot, it is better for the elite to concede democratization through extension of the franchise
than face revolution, because extension of the franchise avoids the cost of revolution.
What determines whether the elite face a commitment problem and hence must extend the
franchise? The elite will not face a commitment problem if they can use trade policy to set a
status quo price, ps, that equates the rest of societys payo¤ under the status quo with what
they would obtain from mounting a revolution. Because revolution is costly, ps does not have to
equal p^. It will lie somewhere between p^" and p^. The commitment problem may arise because,
at the time the threat of revolution occurs, the elite can only credibly commit to set ps in any
future period where the threat of revolution reoccurs. With no threat of revolution, the elite
cannot credibly commit to set anything other than p^". If the threat of revolution is expected
to arise su¢ ciently frequently in the future, then the elite will be able to set ps with su¢ cient
frequency in the future to give the rest of society at least as high a payo¤ as from revolution.
Then the elite will be able to use trade policy to forestall democratization. It is when the threat
of revolution is expected to arise only rarely in future that the elite will not be able to commit
to set ps with su¢ cient frequency to provide a payo¤ as high as revolution. Then the elite do
face a commitment problem, and extension of the franchise represents the only way for the elite
to commit to policy that gives the rest of society at least as high a payo¤ as they would obtain
from revolution.
Let us now develop a formal framework to discuss these ideas. Initially, (de jure) political
power is held by the elite. The elite can exercise this power in the model through their control
of trade policy. Under this specication, and for parsimony of notation, we will say that while
the elite hold power they set pt directly. Denote the value of pt chosen by the elite as p"t .
Assume that, in any given period t, with probability  the rest of society are able to resolve the
coordination problem involved in mounting a revolution and hence are in a position to mount
a revolution. We will refer to this as the high threat stateor H. On the other hand, with
probability 1   the rest of society are unable to resolve their coordination problem and hence
pose no threat to the elite; the low threat stateor L. If in period t the threat level is L, then
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since there is no threat of revolution the elite can set p"t at p^
" with impunity. If the threat level
is H then the elite can respond in one of two ways. They can voluntarily extend the franchise
which ushers in democracy, or they can use trade policy to set the status quo price, ps, that is
favorable to the rest of society to try to maintain the status quo.21
If the threat level is H and the rest of society mount a revolution then it is successful for
sure. Revolution allows the rest of society to install democracy through which the median voter
determines trade policy, pt. Given  < 1, under democracy the median voter is a member of the
rest of society, whose preferred price level is p^. So democratization implies a transfer of power
to set trade policy between the groups.22 The same outcome of democracy can arise if the elite
decide voluntarily to extend the franchise. Since revolution and franchise extension both lead
to democracy, the form of government, F , is either democracy, D, or elite rule, E. Denote the
state in a given period by the tuple (F ; s), where F 2 fE;Dg and s 2 fH;Lg.
Both groups would prefer to avoid revolution because it is costly. Collier (1999) characterizes
three types of economic cost that arise from such conicts: diversion, destruction, and disruption.
Diversion refers to the use of resources for armament instead of other things; destruction is
perhaps the most obvious cost of conict; disruption refers to di¢ culties with allocating resources
e¤ectively that arise as a result of conict. In our formalization we will focus on the disruption
costarising from revolution. Assume that if revolution takes place then, in that period, only a
share  l =  (1 + ) of labor and   =   of land can be allocated to production, where  < 1.
This e¤ectively implies a radial contraction of the production possibility frontier in the period of
revolution. Therefore, revolution results in the same proportional loss of income to both groups.
In the period after revolution and thereafter, full allocation of labour and land to production,
l = 1 +  and  = , is restored.23
21 It is straight forward to extend this framework to allow the elite a third option of using repression. The
simple basic insight one obtains from doing so is that the elite will repress when it is the cheapest option.
22Thus, in the present model, revolution would result only in a transfer of (de jure) political power from the
elite to the rest of society. In AR, revolution would also result in a transfer of elite endowments to the rest of
society as well. Adopting this assumption would not change the qualitative results of the present model. It is
similar to the case discussed in footnote 15 where the elite retain all trade policy revenue and spend it as they see
t. Transferring all elite endowments to the rest of society in a revolution would only a¤ect the range of values
of  for which a revolution constraintbinds; see the discussion following (15).
23 In an earlier version of the paper, I modelled the cost of revolution as being directly proportional to income
itself rather than factor endowments. That approach reected more closely the rst and second costs of revolution:
diversion and destruction. While the results were isomorphic to those of the present paper, they required further
restrictions on the production technology and so held under less general conditions.
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The game is initialized with the assumption that in period 0 there is rule by the elite.
Within a period, t, the sequence of events is as follows.
1. The world price, pw, and the threat level to the elite regime s 2 fH;Lg are revealed.
2. The elite decide whether or not to extend the franchise. If they do then there is democracy.
If they do not, they set trade policy, pt = p"t .
3. If s = H and the elite have not extended the franchise then the rest of society decide
whether or not to mount a revolution. If they do so it is successful for sure, leading to
democracy.
4. If there is democracy then trade policy pt = p^ is set by the median voter (a member of
the rest of society).
5. Production takes place, demands are realized, markets clear and consumption takes place.
Some additional assumptions are needed to complete the specication of the model. Once a
shock to pw has been realized then it is expected to remain at its new level indenitely. If
democracy arises in period t then, since it is an absorbing state (i.e. it cannot be rescinded),
from t+1 onwards the sequence of events starts from stage 4. In that case the state s is no longer
relevant. Otherwise the game starts again from stage 1.24 The fact that all members of each
of the two respective groups, the elite and the rest of society, are identical to one another (but
obviously di¤er across groups by their endowments) makes the analysis of the game simpler
because we can model the members of each group as a single player. So we can model the
situation set out above as a two-player game between the elite and the rest of society.
From the sequence of events above, we can see that the characterization of equilibrium
involves comparing the payo¤s of the elite and the rest of society under the status quo, extension
of the franchise, and revolution. A challenge arises with making these comparisons from the
fact that p^j may be di¤erent under revolution than under the status quo and extension of the
franchise. Observe from (9) that p^j depends on Y (pt), @mt=@pt, j (pt) and @
j
t=@pt, all of
which could in principle be a¤ected by the costs of revolution. But our characterization of the
24The assumption that democracy is an absorbing state enables us to focus the analysis on whether or not it is
possible to set trade policy to forestall democratization. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) present a model where
democracy may fail to consolidate, and the present model could straight-forwardly be extended in that direction.
Galiani and Torrens (2014) allow for this possibility, with interesting policy implications.
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cost of revolution as a radial contraction of the production possibility frontier ensures that p^j
is una¤ected by revolution. Firstly, the fact that in the period of revolution both factors are
reduced in the same proportion,  , implies that agent js overall income share does not change.
Consequently, both j (pt) and @
j
t=@pt are the same in (9) under revolution as they are in the
absence of revolution. Secondly, Y (pt) and @mt=@pt are reduced in the same proportion, as a
result of which Y (pt) = (@mt=@pt) is una¤ected by revolution as well. The result follows.
Proposition 2. Assume that revolution imposes a disruption cost in the period when revolu-
tion occurs, that reduces the labor and land that can be allocated to production by the same
proportion,  < 1. Y (pt) and @mt=@pt are each homogeneous of degree one in labor and land,
and so Y (pt) = (@mt=@pt) is homogeneous of degree zero in labor and land. Consequently, the
solution for p^j given by (9) is invariant to the occurrence of revolution.
See Appendix A.4 for a formal proof. Adapting an approach developed by Syropoulos (2002),
the proof uses the fact that, in the H-O model, the underlying revenue function for a country is
linearly homogeneous in factors. This implies that the output of each good, xit, and its supply
response to a price change, are linearly homogeneous in factors as well. In the present setting,
this implies that both Y (pt) and @mt=@pt are linearly homogeneous in labor and land. So their
ratio must be homogeneous of degree zero. This is the basis on which we can say that the
solution to p^j given by (9) is invariant to the occurrence of revolution.25
A useful implication of Proposition 2 is that, by their linear homogeneity in factors, x"t
and xt are both unambiguously lower in the event of a revolution than otherwise. Using (5)
and (6), and denoting a member of group js income under revolution by Y jR (pt), we can see
straight away that for given pw, Y jR (p^
) =  Y j (p^).26 So the disruption cost to agent j can be
written in terms of income as Y j (p^)  Y jR (p^) = (1   )Y j (p^). This feature will be useful in
the characterization of equilibrium.
25Note that in Section 4 we will analyze comprehensively the e¤ects of a shock to pw on p^j . This analysis will
give us a clear sense of how p^j can change endogenously and how such a change a¤ects the wider economy.
26As before, when pt = p^, Y j (p^) denotes agent js income under full factor supplies.
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3.1 Denition of Equilibrium, Payo¤s, and the Commitment Problem
The concept of equilibrium we will use is that of Markov Perfection, wherein each players
strategy depends only on the state (F ; s) in a given period.27 The strategies played by the
respective groups are as follows. The strategy " (F ; s) played by the elite consists of the choice
over whether or not to extend the franchise, and how to set trade policy. Let f = 0 if the elite
do not extend the franchise (in which case p"t is their choice of trade policy) and f = 1 if they
do. Let  (F j (f; p"t ) ; s) be the strategy played by the rest of society in response to the choices
f and p"t by the elite. This consists of the rest of societys decision as to whether or not to mount
a revolution: a = 1 if they do (where a is a mnemonic for agitate) and 0 otherwise. Since, by
the timing of events determined above, the elite move before the rest of society, the strategy of
the rest of society in a given period is conditioned on that of the elite. Let e" (F ; s) be a best
response to  (F j (f; p"t ) ; s) for all F , s, and let e (F j (f; p"t ) ; s) be a best response to " (F ; s)
for all F , s. Then a pure strategy Markov Perfect equilibrium is a set of mutual best responses
fe" (F ; s) ; e (F j (f; p"t ) ; s)g.
To examine which outcome will arise in equilibrium, we will now formalize the payo¤s to
the respective groups under the various possible outcomes. Let V j (D; p^) represent the present
discounted value under democracy for j 2 f"; g. For a member of group j, the payo¤ to
democracy via an extension of the franchise takes the form:
V j (D; p^)  W
j
 
p^; Y j (p^)

1   : (13)
where the term 1    provides the net present value when, under democracy, trade policy is
chosen by the median voter as pt = p^. Extending the franchise carries no cost and makes an
appealing o¤er to the rest of society in that it represents a way for the elite to make a credible
commitment to p^ in the current and all future periods.
Denoting the occurrence of revolution by R, the payo¤ to revolution is given by
V j (R; p^) W j

p^; Y jR (p^
)

+ 
W j
 
p^; Y j (p^)

1   : (14)
where the rst term captures agent js payo¤ in the period of revolution and the second term
captures the discounted payo¤ in subsequent periods. Clearly, given pt = p^ for all t, both groups
27 In our set-up, any Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) coincides with Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE).
The reason is that the returns to the various strategies open to the elite are independent of history. Since MPE
conditions only on current states, a di¤erent outcome could be obtained under SPE if the elite were able to choose
di¤erent strategies contingent on past outcomes.
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would prefer an extension of the franchise to revolution because this avoids the disruption cost
of revolution (1   )Y j (p^). Therefore, extension of the franchise always has the potential to
defuse revolution. But the elite can use trade policy to defuse the threat of revolution if the rest
of societys payo¤ under trade policy set by the elite is at least as high as under revolution.
We are now ready to formalize the commitment problem. The following revolution con-
straintprovides a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for the elite to face a commitment
problem. Assuming that in period t the state is H, the revolution constraint is binding if:
W 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

+ 
W  (p^; Y  (p^))
1   (15)
> W  (p^; Y  (p^)) + 
W  (p^"; Y  (p^"))
1   :
Notice that the rst line is equal to the payo¤ to revolution for the rest of society given by
(14), while the second line gives their payo¤ from a single period of p^ followed by an indenite
return to p^". By construction, W 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

< W  (p^; Y  (p^)) while W  (p^; Y  (p^)) >
W  (p^"; Y  (p^")). Therefore, for given disruption cost (1   )Y j (p^), the revolution constraint
fails for  su¢ ciently small and binds for  su¢ ciently large. That is, the rest of society must
care enough about the future that they obtain a higher payo¤ from revolution despite the cost,
because they are able to set more favorable trade policy p^ over time, than they would from
a single period of favorable trade policy today, p^, followed by unfavorable trade policy in the
future, p^". If the revolution constraint fails, then the elite can induce a higher level of welfare for
the rest of society by setting p^ for a single period than they could obtain through revolution.
Therefore, the elite could in fact use trade policy to set a price p"t > p^
 that equates the two sides
of (15) for a single period to completely defuse the threat of revolution. Then the commitment
problem does not arise because the elite can completely defuse the threat of revolution within a
single period.
If  is su¢ ciently large that the revolution constraint binds, then the elite cannot simply
defuse the threat of revolution with a single periods trade policy that is favorable to the rest
of society. When the revolution constraint binds, the elite must set p^ for multiple periods to
raise the rest of societys payo¤ above the level they would obtain through a revolution. But
during some of these periods the state may switch to L, during which the elite will only be able
to credibly commit to set p^". If L is expected to occur with su¢ cient frequency, the elite will
not be able to credibly commit to induce a level of welfare for the rest of society that is as high
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as they could obtain from revolution: the elite face a commitment problem. This is the sense
in which the revolution constraint provides a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for the
commitment problem to arise.28
Assume from now on that we choose a value of  so that the revolution constraint binds.
The question of whether or not the elite face a commitment problem comes down to whether the
elite can set a status quo price ps 2 [p^; p^") in every occurrence of H to yield exactly the same
payo¤ for the rest of society as under revolution. If they cannot then they face a commitment
problem. To evaluate this, we need to be able to calculate agent js payo¤ under the status quo:
V j (E; ps;H) W j  ps; Y j (ps)+   V j (E; ps;H) + (1  )V j (E; p^";L) : (16)
The rst term on the right hand side of (16) shows the payo¤ to agent j in the current period,
when the elite set ps. The second term shows the expected payo¤ in the following period, which
is discounted by . If (with probability ) in the following period the state of H is maintained
then the elite will continue to set ps and agent js utility will be maintained at the same level.
But if (with probability 1 ) the state switches to L then the elite will (renege on any promise
to maintain redistribution with ps and) restore their preferred price level p^". Solving recursively,
V j (E; ps;H) is then given by
V j (E; ps;H) =
1   (1  )
1   W
j
 
ps; Y j (ps)

+
 (1  )
1   W
j
 
p^"; Y j (p^")

(17)
The rst term on the right hand side measures the payo¤ to agent j from ps weighted by the
expected frequency of state H, and the second term similarly for p^" given the expected frequency
of state L. So the sum of these terms gives the expected payo¤ to agent j from maintaining the
status quo.
To nd ps, rst dene the function
G (p")  V  (E; p";H)  V  (R; p^) (18)
where p" replaces ps in (17). Then by denition the status quo price, ps, solves G (ps) = 0. This
specication formalizes the idea that to maintain the status quo the elite set ps so that the rest
of society are just indi¤erent between mounting a revolution and not doing so.
28 If we allowed the elite to use some of their income, say from tari¤ revenue, to make direct transfers to the
rest of society in the current period to defuse the threat of revolution, this would increase the value of  necessary
to get the revolution constraint to bind. Relatedly, allowing the rest of society to seize the elites assets in a
revolution would increase the size of the terms on the rst line of the revolution constraint, thus reducing the
necessary size of . But again, the analysis would not be a¤ected in a qualitative way.
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Now that we have specied the commitment problem and payo¤ functions, we can complete
the formalization of the game. According to the above denition of equilibrium, given H, the
elite rst decide whether to extend the franchise, f = 1, or whether to use trade policy to
maintain the status quo, f = 0 and p"t = p
s. Given either of these two actions by the elite, a
member of the rest of societys strategy, a = 0 or a = 1, solves the problem
max ffV  (D; p^) + (1  f)V  (E; ps;H) ; V  (R; p^)g : (19)
The rest of society obtain the rst term in brackets if they choose a = 0 and the second term if
they choose a = 1. With the game formalized in this way, the characterization of equilibrium is
straightforward. This involves evaluating whether or not the elite face a commitment problem.
If they do not, they can use trade policy to avoid a revolution (i.e. set f = 0) and if they do
then they must extend the franchise in order to do so (i.e. set f = 1).
3.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
To characterize equilibrium, we will now take the rst step of examining when the elite face a
commitment problem and hence must extend the franchise. They face a commitment problem
if, in state H, it is not feasible for them to use trade policy to maintain the status quo. To
examine feasibility, let eV  (Ej;H) be the maximum utility that the elite can induce for the
rest of society using trade policy (as an alternative to extending the franchise). This is induced
by setting p^ in every period where H arises, and setting p^" in every period where L arises:
formally, by setting ps = p^ in (17), eV  (Ej;H)  V  (E; p^;H). Then the condition for the
elite to face a commitment problem is eV  (Ej;H) < V  (R; p^). Building on the approach
developed by AR, the next result establishes that there exists a critical level of , denoted , at
which the elite are just able to prevent a revolution using trade policy; for  <  the elite face
a commitment problem and for  >  they do not.
Lemma 1. Assume a value of  for which the revolution constraint binds. Then for  < 1
there exists a (unique)  2 (0; 1) at which eV  (Ej;H) = V  (R; p^).
1. For all  < , eV  (Ej;H) < V  (R; p^) : over this range of  it is not feasible to use trade
policy to prevent a revolution so the elite face a commitment problem.
2. For all  > , eV  (Ej;H) > V  (R; p^) : over this range of  it is feasible to use trade policy
to prevent a revolution so the elite do not face a commitment problem.
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See Appendix A.4 for a formal proof. The logic of Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 3, which
shows the present discounted value of the rest of societys expected welfare when the state is H.
For any value of  2 [0; 1], the gure compares the maximum level of expected welfare that the
elite can induce for the rest of society using trade policy with the payo¤ the rest of society can
get from an extension of the franchise and from revolution.
The value of  is shown in Figure 3 on the horizontal axis while the present discounted
value of the rest of societys expected welfare level is on the vertical axis. The horizontal dashed
line shows the payo¤ to the rest of society from an extension of the franchise, as calculated by
(13). The horizontal solid line shows the payo¤ to revolution, V  (R; p^), given by (14). The
vertical di¤erence between them is proportional to the cost of revolution, (1   )Y  (p^). If we
allowed  = 1 then the two lines would coincide, while the smaller is  < 1 the lower is the
solid line relative to the dashed line. The upward sloping line shows eV  (Ej;H). The intercept
of eV  (Ej;H) with the vertical axis, where  = 0, corresponds to the payo¤ that the rest of
society receive from a policy of p^ in the current period followed by reversion to p^" for all periods
in the future. This is the payo¤ given by the second line of the revolution constraint, (15). Recall
that we have chosen a value of  such that the revolution constraint binds. This implies that
the intercept of eV  (Ej;H) is lower than V  (R; p^) given by the horizontal solid line, which
provides a graphical representation that the revolution constraint is a necessary condition for
the commitment problem. eV  (Ej;H) slopes upwards from this point because an increase in
 increases the expected number of periods in the future for which the elite set p^ as opposed to
p^". If  = 1 then the elite set p"t = p^
 in every period in the future, inducing the same level of
welfare as democracy via an extension of the franchise. Given this structure, there must exist a
value, , at which eV  (Ej;H) = V  (R; p^). Note that ! 1 as  ! 1.
Now consider the elites options in state H. For  > , it is feasible for the elite to use trade
policy to maintain the status quo because they can feasibly induce a level of welfare in the rest
of society that is at least as great as from revolution: eV  (Ej;H) > V  (R; p^) over this range.
This is based on the fact that the expected number of periods in the future for which the elite
can set p^ as opposed to p^" is su¢ ciently large. For  < , eV  (Ej;H) < V  (R; p^) because
the expected number of periods in the future for which the elite can set p^ is not su¢ ciently
large. So in this case the elite do face a commitment problem, and must extend the franchise in
order to defuse the threat of revolution.
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Having established the range of  for which it is feasible for the elite to use trade policy
to maintain the status quo, we will now examine the trade policy that the elite actually set in
equilibrium, by providing a characterization of ps. Letting p" = p^" in (18), G (p^") < 0 by the
revolution constraint. Therefore, if a value ps exists such that G (ps) = 0, it must be because
the payo¤ in the current period under ps is W  (ps; Y  (ps)) > W  (p^"; Y  (p^")). And by the
optimality of the choice of p^, it must be the case that W  (p^; Y  (p^)) > W  (ps; Y  (ps)).
Putting these observations together, W  (p^; Y  (p^)) > W  (ps; Y  (ps)) > W  (p^"; Y  (p^")). It
also follows, by the fact that p^" > p^ and the concavity of W j
 
pt; Y
j (pt)

, that p^" > ps > p^.
Note, again by the concavity ofW j
 
pt; Y
j (pt)

, that there is another value of pt that would yield
the same level of welfare for  as ps, but the elite would never choose this because it is even further
away from p^" than p^. We can therefore also say that W " (p^"; Y " (p^")) > W " (ps; Y " (ps)) >
W " (p^; Y " (p^)).
The nal step is to prove that a value of ps exists such that G (ps) = 0. Recall that, by
denition, G (p^) = 0 at . And by inspection of (17), V  (E; ps;H) is increasing in  for given
ps. So G (p^) > 0 for  >  and, by concavity of W  (pt; Y  (pt)) in pt, there must exist a unique
value of ps > p^ at which G (ps) = 0. Moreover, ps increases continuously as  is increased. But
it cannot reach p^" by the fact that the revolution constraint is binding. So there must exist a
value of ps for which p^" > ps > p^. We have now proved the following result:
Proposition 3. Assume a value of  su¢ ciently high that the revolution constraint binds.
For  > , there exists a unique status quo price, ps, that entails a compromise between the
two groups in the sense that: (i) p^" > ps > p^; (ii) W  (p^; Y  (p^)) > W  (ps; Y  (ps)) >
W  (p^"; Y  (p^")) ; and (iii) W " (p^"; Y " (p^")) > W " (ps; Y " (ps)) > W " (p^; Y " (p^)).
With our characterization of the status quo price in hand, we can we can now characterize
equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Assume a value of  su¢ ciently high that the revolution constraint binds.
For  6=  there exists a unique pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium with the following
characteristics.
(i) If  <  then the elite will respond to the threat of revolution by extending the franchise.
(ii) If  >  then in response to the threat of revolution the elite will temporarily raise the rest
of societys welfare by setting the status quo price using trade policy.
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A full formal statement and proof of Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix A.4. We have
already seen in the discussion of Lemma 1 that for  <  the elite face a commitment problem
and so must extend the franchise, while for  >  they can induce a higher level of expected
welfare than the rest of society could obtain from revolution by setting p^. But to maintain
the status quo, the elite only have to set trade policy to equalize the level of expected welfare
that the rest of society would obtain under revolution. Therefore, ps induces a level of expected
welfare that is exactly equal to revolution, given by the solid horizontal line to the right of . It
follows that the higher the value of  above , the closer ps can be to p^" and still induce a level
of expected welfare for the rest of society equivalent to revolution. This also implies that, as 
approaches  from above, ps must converge to p^ from above.29
Building on Proposition 4, we can now characterize in more detail the relationship between
democratization, trade liberalization and economic e¢ ciency. By the Stolper-Samuelson The-
orem, owners of the scarce factor seek a relatively closed trade regime. If the country has a
comparative advantage in good  then elite rule will entail a relatively closed trade regime while
democracy will entail a relatively open regime. The converse preference over openness will hold
across the groups if the country has a comparative advantage in good ". These observations can
be combined with Proposition 4 in a straight forward way to yield the following result.
Proposition 5. Consider the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4.
(i) If  <  and the country has a comparative advantage in good " (good ) then under
elite rule the trade regime is relatively open (closed). Then the threat of revolution is met
by extension of the franchise, trade protectionism (liberalization), and a decrease (increase) in
economic e¢ ciency.
(ii) If  >  then the elite will temporarily raise the rest of societys welfare using trade policy in
response to the threat of revolution. If the country has a comparative advantage in good " (good
) then this involves temporary trade protectionism (trade liberalization) and a correspondingly
temporary decrease (increase) in economic e¢ ciency.
Proposition 5(i) shows that quite a stringent set of conditions is required for democratization to
29 In this deterministic, perfect information environment there are no revolutions on the equilibrium path. One
way for revolution to occur in equilibrium is if there is some uncertainty over whether or not the rest of society
can resolve their coordination problem. This uncertainty would make a risk-neutral elite less generous towards
the rest of society in their setting of ps, meaning that the elite would do better when coordination fails but worse
when it doesnt. Otherwise the basic logic of the policy choice would be the same.
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go hand in hand with trade liberalization and a corresponding increase in economic e¢ ciency,
as advocated by Smith (1776): the probability that the rest of society will resolve their coor-
dination problem must be low, and the elite must own the scarce factor. Indeed, if the elite
own the relatively abundant factor then democratization will entail retrenchment to a relatively
protectionist regime and a reduction in e¢ ciency. Moreover, Proposition 5(ii) shows that if the
opportunity to mount a revolution arises relatively frequently, the elite will actually use trade
liberalization to forestall democratization. It is in these respects that the conditions under which
a ruling elite can be expected to follow classical liberal advocations are quite stringent.
4 Dictatorial Trade Policy Responses to PermanentWorld Price
Shocks
We will now undertake comparative statics on the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 5,
with a specic focus on the policy response to a permanent world price shock. For the purposes
of this exercise, we will restrict the parameter space to the region where  > . This puts us in
the range where equilibrium is characterized by Proposition 5(ii). In this range, if s = H then
the elite do not face a commitment problem. By restricting parameters in this way, we will be
able to focus on the way that a shock to pw a¤ects ps and hence trade policy.
If a shock to pw makes revolution more attractive to the rest of society, then the elite must
adjust ps so as to increase the payo¤ to the rest of society from maintaining the status quo. If
a shock to pw makes revolution less attractive, the elite can adjust ps to raise their own payo¤
at the rest of societys expense. Formally, the relationship between pw and ps is given by:
@ps
@pw
=  @G (p
s; pw) =@pw
@G (ps; pw) =@ps
;
where here we write G () to show its dependence on pw.
To use the model structure that we have developed above to sign @ps=@pw, we can equiva-
lently evaluate @ps=@pw using the following:
dW  (ps; Y  (ps))
dpw
=
1  
1   (1  )
dW 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

dpw
+

1   (1  )
dW  (p^; Y  (p^))
dpw
   (1  )
1   (1  )
dW  (p^"; Y  (p^"))
dpw
(20)
where
dW  (ps; Y  (ps))
dpw
=
@W  (ps; Y  (ps))
@pw
+
@W  (ps; Y  (ps))
@ps
@ps
@pw
; (21)
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dW 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

dpw
=
@W 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

@pw
+
@W 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

@p^
@p^
@pw
; (22)
dW  (p^; Y  (p^))
dpw
=
@W  (p^; Y  (p^))
@pw
+
@W  (p^; Y  (p^))
@p^
@p^
@pw
; (23)
and
dW  (p^"; Y  (p^"))
dpw
=
@W  (p^"; Y  (p^"))
@pw| {z }
Direct e¤ect
+
@W  (p^"; Y  (p^"))
@p^"
@p^"
@pw| {z }
Indirect e¤ect
: (24)
Equation (20) is obtained by using (14) and (17) in (18), where p" = ps so that G (ps; pw) = 0,
then di¤erentiating the resulting expression with respect to pw and rearranging. Expanding out
the left hand side of (20) as shown in (21), we see that @ps=@pw is in the nal term.
From equations (21) to (24), we can see that there are two e¤ects through which a change in
pw must inuence ps via (20). One is through the directe¤ect of a change in pw on Y  (pt) and
henceW  (p^"; Y  (p^")),W  (p^; Y  (p^)) andW  (ps; Y  (ps)). The other is through the indirect
e¤ects whereby a change in pw a¤ects p^" and p^.
Equations (22) and (23) capture the e¤ect of a shock to pw on the rest of societys payo¤ to
revolution (followed by democracy), while (24) captures the e¤ect on their payo¤ to maintaining
the status quo. From (20), the sign of dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw (and hence @ps=@pw) is clear cut
if these e¤ects have opposite signs. But as we shall see, they may have the same signs, in which
case the sign of dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw is ambiguous. The direct and indirect e¤ects are given
by the rst and second terms respectively of equations (22)-(24). We will take each in turn,
starting with the indirect e¤ects because the analysis will also be helpful in determining the
direct e¤ects. (We will discuss the direct and indirect e¤ects for (21) in due course.)
To obtain the indirect e¤ects, we need to sign @p^"=@pw and @p^=@pw, and to do this we
need to return to group js preferred price problem as given by (8). We can ascertain the e¤ect
of a change in pw on p^j by di¤erentiating (8) with respect to pw:
dfocjt
dpw
=
@W jt
@Y jt
j (pt)

 @mt
@pt
+ (pt   pw) @
2mt
@pt@pw

(25)
+
@W jt
@Y jt
@Yt
@pw
@jt
@pt
:
If the right hand side of this expression is positive then an increase in pw brings about an increase
in p^j ; if it is negative then the e¤ect on p^j is the opposite. Recall from the discussion following
(8) that focj (pt) is determined by two e¤ects: js distortion share and the Stolper-Samuelson
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e¤ect on j. The rst line on the right hand side of (25) captures how a shock to pw a¤ects js
distortion share and the second line captures how the shock to pw changes the Stolper-Samuelson
e¤ect on j. We will take each of these in turn.
First recall that, under the assumptions we have already made, @W jt =@Y
j
t > 0 for all
Y jt  0. Also, the rst term in brackets on the rst line,  @mt=@pt, is positive whether the
countrys comparative advantage is in good " or good . Economic theory does not impose any
conditions on the sign of the second-cross-partial derivative in the second term. However, it is
reasonable to assume that, being of second order, it will be smaller than the rst term. We
will assume this to be the case throughout our analysis.30 Whether we think of this e¤ect in
terms of js distortion share, or a price e¤ect, the impact of a positive shock to pw on both p^"
and p^ would unambiguously be positive. If there were only an impact through this channel,
as under quasi-linear preferences for example, then the impact of pw on both p^" and p^ would
unambiguously be positive.
Regarding the term on the second line, which captures the Stolper-Samuelsonor income
e¤ect on j, we have already established from (10) and (11) that @"t=@pt > 0 and @

t =@pt < 0.
The nal step is to evaluate the sign of @Yt=@pw. From (4) and (5):
@Yt
@pw
=   1
1  (pt   pw) c" (pt)mt: (26)
At free trade (i.e. for pt = pw), we see that this expression captures the standard e¤ect whereby
an increase in a countrys terms-of-trade improves national income. Accordingly, if the country
has a comparative advantage in good " and pt = pw then in a trading equilibrium mt < 0
and @Yt=@pw > 0. What about if pt > pw? Given (pt   pw) c" (pt) < 1, the coe¢ cient on mt
in (26) is unambiguously negative. If pt < pw then this is immediate. Therefore, @Yt=@pw >
0 and hence @W jt =@Y
j
t  @Yt=@pw > 0 if the country has a comparative advantage in good
". Use this to consider the e¤ect of a positive shock to pw on p^" when the country has a
comparative advantage in good ". Since @"t=@pt > 0, the Stolpher-Samuelson/income e¤ect
@W "t =@Y
"
t @Yt=@pw @"t=@pt > 0, and works in the same direction as the distortion share/price
e¤ect. Therefore, with a comparative advantage in good ", the e¤ect of a positive shock to pw
on p^" is unambiguously positive. The same is true for the e¤ect of a shock to pw on p^ with a
comparative advantage in good . While @W jt =@Y
j
t  @Yt=@pw < 0 because mt > 0 in (26) this
30This assumption can be demonstrated to hold for all admissible parameter values of the constant elasticity
of substitution (C.E.S.) example that we develop in Appendix A.5.
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time, we alternatively have @t =@pt < 0. And so again the income e¤ect is positive, and works
in the same direction as the price e¤ect.
It is now straight forward to see that ambiguities will arise for the other two cases: a shock
to pw on p^ with a comparative advantage in good " or on p^" with a comparative advantage
in good . The reason for the ambiguity is that the impact through the income e¤ect channel
is negative, and operates in the opposite direction to impact through the price e¤ect channel.
For a comparative advantage in good ", @W "t =@Y
"
t  @Yt=@pw  @t =@pt < 0, and similarly for a
comparative advantage in good , @W t =@Y

t  @Yt=@pw  @"t=@pt < 0.31 Let us summarize the
preceding discussion as follows.32
Lemma 2. (i) Assume a comparative advantage in good ", so pa  p^ < pw  p^". Then a
positive shock to pw unambiguously increases p^"; if p^ is at an interior solution pa < p^, the
e¤ect on p^ is ambiguous and corresponds to the sign of (25); if in the absence of domestic scal
capacity p^ is at a corner solution, pa= p^, then a shock to pw has no e¤ect on p^.
(ii) Assume a comparative advantage in good , so p^  pw < p^"  pa. Then a positive shock
to pw unambiguously increases p^; if p^" is at an interior solution p^" < pa, the e¤ect on p^" is
ambiguous and corresponds to the sign of (25); if in the absence of domestic scal capacity p^"
is at a corner solution, p^" = pa, then a shock to pw has no e¤ect on p^".
Summarizing the indirect e¤ect, Lemma 2 has established that there is an ambiguity over
the sign of @p^=@pw when the comparative advantage is in good " and @p^"=@pw when the
comparative advantage is in good , and in these cases there is an ambiguity in the indirect
e¤ect; otherwise, away from corner solutions involving autarky, pa, @p^j=@pw is positive. To
consider systematically the implications for signing (20), and hence @ps=@pw, it will be useful
to partition the analysis by comparative advantage. In the next subsection, we will consider
arguably the more familiar case, in which the country has a comparative advantage in good ,
so the trade policy instrument applied to good " is an import tari¤. In the subsection following
that we will consider the case where the country has a comparative advantage in good ", and
the trade policy instrument applied to good " is an export tax.
It remains to sign the direct e¤ect, @W 
 
p^j ; Y 
 
p^j

=@pw = @W 
 
p^j ; Y 
 
p^j

=@Y jt 
@Y jt =@p
w, which is determined by (26). If the country has a comparative advantage in good "
31 In Appendix A.5 we illustrate this ambiguity using our C.E.S. example.
32See Appendix A.4 for a proof.
30
then @W 
 
p^j ; Y 
 
p^j

=@pw > 0 because @Y jt =@p
w > 0; if the comparative advantage is in good
 then @W 
 
p^j ; Y 
 
p^j

=@pw < 0 because @Y jt =@p
w < 0, j 2 f"; g.33
4.1 Response to World Price Shock with Comparative Advantage in Good 
With a comparative advantage in good , p^  pw < p^"  pa. Throughout this subsection, we
will focus our discussion on the situation where there is no scal capacity, and so p^ = pw, while
pw < p^"  pa by Proposition 1(ii). This will not have a qualitative impact on our results, as will
be made clear where relevant.
Look rst at (22) and (23). With a comparative advantage in good , the direct e¤ect is
negative. Regarding the indirect e¤ect, since p^ = pw is a corner solution it is immediate that
@p^=@pw > 0. And since p^ is constrained above its optimum level, @W 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

=@p^ < 0.
Therefore the indirect e¤ect is negative as well, and so, by (22), dW 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

=dpw < 0.34
Exactly the same properties hold for (23) and so dW  (p^; Y  (p^)) =dpw < 0 as well. Therefore,
the e¤ect of a shock to pw is to reduce the rest of societys payo¤ to revolution.
Turning to dW  (p^"; Y  (p^")) =dpw, we see that its sign is ambiguous. The direct e¤ect is
negative: @W  (p^"; Y  (p^")) =@pw < 0, as it was for (22) and (23). Regarding the indirect e¤ect,
we know that @W  (p^"; Y  (p^")) =@p^" < 0 by p^" > p^ and the concavity of W  (pt; Y  (pt)). So
the ambiguity all comes down to the ambiguity over the sign of @p^"=@pw identied in Lemma
2. If @p^"=@pw < 0 then the indirect e¤ect is positive, and if it is larger than the direct e¤ect
then dW  (p^"; Y  (p^")) =dpw > 0 and dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw < 0. But if the indirect e¤ect is
smaller than the direct e¤ect, or if @p^"=@pw > 0, then dW  (p^"; Y  (p^")) =dpw < 0 and the sign
of dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw is ambiguous. Therefore, there is an ambiguity in the e¤ect of a shock
to pw on the rest of societys payo¤ to maintaining the status quo.
A simple way to resolve this ambiguity is by putting a lower bound on . Looking at (20),
we can see that the coe¢ cients on the three terms on the right hand side are all monotonically
decreasing in . But the coe¢ cient on the third term dW  (p^"; Y  (p^")) =dpw, the sign of which
we have just seen is ambiguous, decreases more quickly than the other two and eventually goes
33By (6), Y jt = 
j
tYt and so @Y
j
t =@p
w = jt@Yt=@p
w; jt as determined by (1) is una¤ected by a change in p
w.
34The outcome is the same when there is domestic scal capacity. Then, p^ can be set at its optimal level and
so @W  (p^; Y R (p^
)) =@p^ = 0. Also, although it has no bearing on this case, we established in Lemma 2 that
@p^=@pw > 0. Therefore, by (22) dW  (p^; Y R (p^
)) =dpw < 0.
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to zero.35 The derivatives that appear on the right hand side of (20) (dW 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

=dpw
etc.) are given and do not depend on  or . So we can always increase  to the point where the
absolute magnitude of the third term is smaller than the sum of the other two. We know the
sum of the rst two terms is unambiguously negative. So there exists a lower bound on , which
we will call e, above which (20) must be negative. Given our restriction to the range  >  in
this section, it must be the case that 1 > e  . Then for any  > e, dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw < 0
and the ambiguity is resolved.
Over the range 1 > e  , we can now say how ps must be adjusted in response to
a shock to pw. To do so, consider (21). We have already established that the right hand
side of (20) is negative for  > e. So for this range of  the sum of the components on
the right hand side of (21), must be negative as well. And we already know that the direct
e¤ect is negative, given a comparative advantage in good . Providing the magnitude of the
direct e¤ect, @W  (ps; Y  (ps)) =@pw, is smaller than the total e¤ect, dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw, the
indirect e¤ect must be negative as well. Since @Y t =@p
w = t @Yt=@p
w is a component of the
direct e¤ect, the direct e¤ect is su¢ ciently small if the rest of societys relative income share,
t , is su¢ ciently small. This can be ensured by increasing the size of the elites endowment
of land relative to the labor endowment.36 This ensures in turn that the rest of societys loss
of tari¤ revenue income through trade liberalization does not make them favor an increase in
protection, reecting the typical situation in dictatorships where the rest of society are not
signicant beneciaries of tari¤ revenue. So for t su¢ ciently small, the indirect e¤ect must be
negative. By the concavity of W  (pt; Y  (pt)) in pt, coupled with the fact that p^" > ps > p^, we
have that @W  (ps; Y  (ps)) =@ps < 0. So for the indirect e¤ect to be negative, it must be the
case that @ps=@pw > 0. We will now summarize this result and then discuss its implications.
Proposition 6. Assume a comparative advantage in good . There exists a lower bounde 2 [; 1) for which dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw < 0 for all  > e. Over this range, for t su¢ ciently
small, a positive shock to pw results in an increase in ps : @ps=@pw > 0.
The intuition for this result is similar to that for the characterization of equilibrium in Proposi-
35The rst derivative of the rst and second terms with respect to  are   ( (1  )) = (1   (1  ))2 and
 2= (1   (1  ))2 respectively, whereas for the third term it is more negative, at  = (1   (1  ))2.
36 In our current exposition, recall that the endowments of both labor and land have been normalized to 1.
Nothing would change about the underlying analysis beyond a rebalancing of income share away from the rest of
society if we increased the endowment of land relative to labor.
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tion 4. We know that the welfare e¤ect on the rest of society from a shock to pw is ambiguous
in the low threat state, as given by the third term on the right hand side of (20). But with
 su¢ ciently large, the welfare e¤ect is driven by the outcome under revolution, which is not
ambiguous. In other words, with  su¢ ciently large, the elite can credibly commit to respond
to a shock to pw by adjusting ps in such a way that will make the rest of society better o¤.
We still do not have a clear cut prediction about the direction in which tari¤s must be
adjusted. The formula for an ad valorem tari¤ is  = (ps   pw) =pw. From this we see that, to
obtain a positive relationship between pw and  , it must be the case that @ps=@pw > 1 (and
not just @ps=@pw > 0). This can be accomplished by assuming that  < 1 is su¢ ciently large,
and hence  is su¢ ciently large. To understand the issue, look at (21). We know that the
magnitude of the sum of the terms on the right hand side is given by the sum of the terms on
the right hand side of (20), and for  > e this must be negative. We also know that for t
su¢ ciently small, both the direct and indirect e¤ects in (21) must be negative. For given , we
can take ps and hence the direct e¤ect @W  (ps; Y  (ps)) =@pw as given. So the magnitude of
the indirect e¤ect is given as well. Now if we can use the structure of the model to restrict the
magnitude of @W  (ps; Y  (ps)) =@ps, then the size of @ps=@pw must increase correspondingly.
At p^, @W  (p^; Y  (p^)) =@p^ = 0. And by the concavity of W  (pt; Y  (pt)) in pt, we can make
@W  (ps; Y  (ps)) =@ps smaller by pushing ps closer to p^. We can achieve this by limiting the
range (in equilibrium) of ps above p^. Recall from the discussion following Proposition 4 that as
 approaches  from above, ps must converge towards p^ from above. And we can restrict the
range of  relative to  by increasing  through an increase in  < 1. So there exists a value
of  < 1 su¢ ciently large that we must have @ps=@pw > 1. Looking at this another way, the
concavity of W  (pt; Y  (pt)) in pt implies that, if ps is a long way from p^, the responsiveness
of welfare to a change in ps will be large. Correspondingly, @ps=@pw required to maintain the
status quo would be small: perhaps not enough to match the change in pw. The restriction on
 < 1 is su¢ cient to restrict  to a range where this cannot happen. Summarizing:
Proposition 7. Assume a comparative advantage in good . Given t su¢ ciently small, and
 < 1 su¢ ciently large, there exists a value of  2 (0; 1) (and hence e 2 [; 1)) su¢ ciently large
that for  > e   there is a more-than-proportional increase of ps in response to a shock to
pw : @ps=@pw > 1. Consequently, the increase in ps required in response to a positive shock to
pw would be brought about by an increase in the ad valorem tari¤  = (ps   pw) =pw.
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The intuition behind this result is more naturally understood in terms of a reduction in pw. If
 > e   is su¢ ciently large, as the world price of the imported good falls, free trade becomes
more valuable to the rest of society. This increases the payo¤ to democracy and hence to a
revolution. This in turn provokes the elite to move ps and  in the direction that the rest of
society would like to see it go, namely towards free trade.
4.2 Response to World Price Shock with Comparative Advantage in Good "
Consider now the case where the country has a comparative advantage in good ", so that pa 
p^ < pw  p^". Recall that in this case the direct e¤ect is positive, @W   p^j ; Y   p^j =@pw > 0
for j 2 f"; g, because now @Yt=@pw > 0. As in Subsection 4.1, let us continue to assume that
there is no scal capacity, and so p^" = pw while pa  p^ < pw by Proposition 1(i). Again, this
will not have a qualitative impact on our results.
We will continue to use equations (20)-(24) to assess the impact of a positive shock to
pw on ps. Let us focus on the case where p^ is at an interior solution, pa  p^ < pw, since
the corner solution is similar. Note that, by Lemma 2, with a comparative advantage in good
", it is the sign of @p^=@pw that is ambiguous. But because @W 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

=@p^ = 0 and
@W  (p^; Y  (p^)) =@p^ = 0, the indirect e¤ects in (22) and (23) are both zero. Therefore, the
signs of (22) and (23) are both determined by the positive signs of the direct e¤ects alone. So
dW 
 
p^; Y R (p^
)

=dpw > 0 and dW  (p^; Y  (p^)) =dpw > 0.37
Turning to dW  (p^"; Y  (p^")) =dpw as determined by (24), rst note that the direct e¤ect
is positive as in the rst two terms of (20). The indirect e¤ect is negative by the concavity
of W  (pt; Y  (pt)) coupled with the fact that p^" > p^, plus the fact that @p^"=@pw > 0 unam-
biguously.38 So, as for a comparative advantage in good , the sign of dW  (p^"; Y  (p^")) =dpw
depends on whether the direct or the indirect e¤ect is larger. Evidently, with a comparative
advantage in good " the ambiguity may still arise.
Like for a comparative advantage in good , a simple way to resolve this ambiguity is by
putting a lower bound on . Since, again, it is the third term of (20) that introduces the
37There is no signicance to the fact that the details of the analysis di¤er under a comparative advantage in
good " to good . If we had chosen good " to be the numeraire, then the indirect e¤ects in equations (22) and
(23) would have been zero for a comparative advantage in good  instead of good ".
38Even in the presence of domestic scal capacity, by Lemma 2(i), with a comparative advantage in good ",
@p^"=@pw > 0 unambiguously.
34
ambiguity, and since the coe¢ cient on the third term is decreasing in  more quickly than
the rst and second, we can always nd a lower bound 1 > e   such that, for any  > e,
dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw > 0 and the ambiguity is resolved.
We can now say how ps must be adjusted in response to a shock to pw. Once again, we can
use (21). We know that, for  > e, the sum of the terms on the right hand side of (20) must be
positive. So the total e¤ect, given by the sum of the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect in (21),
must be as well. We already know that, given a comparative advantage in good , the direct
e¤ect is positive. Once again, t must be su¢ ciently small for the direct e¤ect not to be larger
than the total e¤ect. Then the indirect e¤ect must be positive. And once again by the concavity
ofW  (pt; Y  (pt)) in pt, coupled with the fact that p^" > ps > p^ and @W  (p^; Y  (p^)) =@p^ = 0,
we have that @W  (ps; Y  (ps)) =@ps < 0. In order for the indirect e¤ect to be positive, it must
therefore be the case that @ps=@pw < 0. This means that a positive shock to pw must bring
about a reduction in ps: the opposite to when there is a comparative advantage in good .
The equation for an ad valorem export tax,  ex, is  ex = (ps   pw) =pw, where ps < pw
so that  ex is negative. The fact that ps responds to a shock to pw by moving in the opposite
direction takes away the need for the response of ps to pw to be su¢ ciently large. Therefore, for
 > e, any positive shock to pw will unambiguously lead to an increase in the size of the export
tax. The analysis is summarized in the following result.
Proposition 8. Assume a comparative advantage in good ". For t su¢ ciently small, there
exists a lower bound e 2 [; 1] for which dW  (ps; Y  (ps)) =dpw > 0 for all  > e. Over this
range, a positive shock to pw results in a decrease in ps, and this would be brought about by an
increase in the size of the ad valorem export tax  ex = (ps   pw) =pw.
As the world price of the export rises, free trade becomes more appealing to the elite. But the
rest of society would in this case prefer the economy to remain protectionist. So an increase in
pw would increase the payo¤ to democracy, and hence to a revolution. This in turn provokes
the elite to move ps and  ex in the direction that the rest of society would like to see it go, in
this case towards autarky.
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5 Linking 19th Century British and Prussian Trade Policy
The di¤ering trade policy outcomes motivated by Propositions 7 and 8 would be driven si-
multaneously by a common technology shock that resulted from an improvement in transport
technology and a fall in transport costs. Such a fall in transport costs would simultaneously
reduce pw as viewed from the country with a comparative advantage in good  while increasing
pw as viewed from the country with a comparative advantage in ". In the country with a com-
parative advantage in good , the response would be to reduce the tari¤ while the country with
a comparative advantage in good " would increase its export tax.
The extended discussion of historical trade policy episodes in Appendix B provides detailed
evidence to suggest that Proposition 7 predicts British trade policy from 1815-1846 while Propo-
sition 8 predicts the trade policy experience in Prussia over the same period. Summarizing, from
the perspective of 19th Century Europe, a permanent fall in the world price of grain and other
food stu¤s was brought about by the amazing decline in international transport costswhich
facilitated imports from the New World (ORourke and Williamson 1999: 33). This provided a
plausibly exogenous technological impetus to observed permanent changes in world prices and
hence trade policy. Britains comparative advantage in manufactures can be associated with
a comparative advantage in good  in our framework. In response to the fall in grain prices,
Britain reduced its import tari¤ on grain from 70 percent in 1815 to free trade in 1846. Prus-
sia had a comparative advantage in good ", in this case grain, and adopted the most liberal
trade regime in Europeat the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. But Prussia progressively
increased protectionism, (both through tari¤s and export taxes) over the same period (Kindle-
berger 1975). To obtain this prediction from our model, we also have to assume that a high
threat state was maintained for a protracted period in both countries. The historical evidence
provided in Appendix B does indeed suggest that the period from the end of the Napoleonic
wars through to the middle of the 19th Century was among the most tumultuous in European
history. Reecting this in our framework, it seems reasonable to argue that a high threat state
was maintained throughout the period 1815-1846. Under this assumption, our framework can
explain the observed divergence in trade policy responses between Britain and Prussia in terms
of a common technology-driven world price shock. This divergence cannot be explained by stan-
dard political economy models such as Grossman and Helpman (1994), which would predict that
trade policy in both countries would have moved in the same direction in response to the shock.
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6 Conclusions
It is generally agreed that democratization and trade liberalization are benecial from a nor-
mative perspective. But we have seen in this paper that the conditions under which those with
the power to democratize and liberalize might actually be expected to do so are quite strin-
gent. Not only must the ruling elite own the relatively scarce factor, but the opportunity to
mount a revolution must arise infrequently as well. If the elite own the abundant factor and
democratization does take place, then the trade policy adopted by the newly formed democratic
government will be more protectionist than that under elite rule and, all else equal, e¢ ciency
will be reduced. The paper also characterized a set of circumstances under which the ruling elite
could use trade policy to forestall democratization. The dynamics of this equilibrium outcome
were then illustrated in terms of the improvements in transportation technology throughout
the early 19th Century. It appears that the predictions of the model were borne out in policy
practice over the period and these actions would not have been predicted by standard political
economy models.
This paper opens the door to three main areas of research. Let us close by briey discussing
the scope for future research in each of these areas in turn. First, there is mounting empirical
evidence in support for the threat of revolution hypothesis as an explanation for extension
of the franchise: see Aidt and Jensen (2014) and the references therein. This literature nds
evidence that occasions when democratic transitions actually occurred were precipitated by a
threat of revolution. The theory laid out in the present paper suggests that it would also be
useful to look for evidence of situations where a revolutionary threat existed but no extension of
the franchise occurred because the elite were able to defuse the threat using trade policy. To put
this another way, the present paper provides a new motive for trade policy: to maintain political
stability. And it provides a set of predictions about how this new motive could be tested for in
the data.
The framework introduced in this paper focuses on a situation where world price shocks are
permanent, which seems reasonable when the underlying forces driving the shocks are permanent
such as technological innovation. Yet it seems likely that trade policy is also used to maintain
political stability in response to temporary world price shocks as well. The model developed in
this paper could be extended to consider other situations where world price shocks are temporary,
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such as crop failures arising from extreme weather events. For example between 2007 and 2011,
in response to a large but temporary spike in world food prices, an estimated 33 food-exporting
countries resorted to restrictions on exports of grains, rice, and other foodstu¤s in response to
the initial increase in food prices (Sharma 2011). Moreover, a number of these countries were
dictatorships such as Egypt and Jordan. Burke and Leigh (2010) nd no evidence that temporary
terms-of-trade shocks driven by demand side factors precipitated democratic transitions. Seen
in the light of the theory developed in the present paper, their ndings provoke the question of
whether the threat of revolution was defused using trade policy. This issue could be explored
theoretically by combining the model of temporary surges in import demand developed by
Bagwell and Staiger (2003) with the one developed in the present paper.
Second, what does the framework tell us not just about how dictatorships respond to price
shocks but how democracies respond as well? After all, in the recent food price shocks, although
some of the countries that restricted exports were dictatorships some were democracies. We can
get an idea of how the model could be extended to consider the trade policy reaction of a demo-
cratically elected government by looking at equilibrium equation (18). In a democracy the costs
of losing power are likely to be smaller and shorter lived. The overall time horizon over which
the costs of losing power must be discounted might also be shorter, say the normal expected life
of a parliament. Having made these adjustments, maintaining the status quo using trade policy
might nevertheless represent a reasonable way of thinking about the determination of policy in a
democratic setting. To the extent that democracies have higher incomes they also tend to have
greater scal capacity, implying greater reliance on domestic policy instruments to address such
shocks and less reliance on trade policy. But since we sometimes observe similar trade policy
responses in practice from some democracies, the model might o¤er some rudimentary insight
into the forces at work.
Third, an empirical literature initiated by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) tests the predictions
of the standard Grossman-Helpman type framework against the data. The present paper o¤ers
a framework that may do a better job of explaining the patterns in the data under dictatorship.
The testable predictions seem quite straightforward. If a ruling elite own a scarce factor then
democratization and trade liberalization will be positively related. If they own an abundant
factor then the relationship will be negative. My sense is that, before this model can be tested
econometrically, further research is needed to determine whether dictatorships and democracies
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can be considered within a unifying framework or whether they should be considered separately.
But once we have a clearer idea of the answer to that question, the empirical testing of this
framework o¤ers an interesting agenda for future research.
Some of the ideas discussed above have been developed in a long-standing literature on trade
policy as social protection. This literature has re-emerged recently to argue that while trade-
based measures are second-best, they may represent the most practical redistributive policies
available to many developing countries: see for example Do, Levchenko and Ravallion (2014) and
the references therein. The present paper makes a di¤erent but related point that dictatorial
regimes are unlikely to heed calls to remove export-restrictive measures if they are instrumental
in their political survival. In future research it would be useful to try to distinguish empirically
between these motivations for trade policy. One key di¤erence between the two motivations is
that the framework of the present paper envisages a relatively high level of asset inequality that
would allow the elite to self-insure during times when world food prices move against them. On
the other hand, social cohesion over a social insurance scheme would be more likely to arise
in situations where the level of asset inequality were not so high. On this basis, it might be
possible to use panel data on the land-gini as a way to distinguish between the motivation for
export restrictions during food price shocks. Another aspect is that the higher levels of social
cohesion associated with the operation of social insurance schemes are more closely associated
with democracy than dictatorship. This is consistent with the fact that the social insurance
literature assumes that the government will operate the scheme for sure, perhaps under the
assumption that it is bound by a democratic mandate. The approach to policy assumed in the
present paper is that the government would only operate such a scheme when it was forced to do
so; motivation more closely associated with dictatorship. Therefore, in attempting to distinguish
between these motivations, it might be possible to use the form of government as a determinant.
Much work remains to be done in order to fully understand the use of trade policy to maintain
political stability proposed in the present paper, and how important this motivation for trade
policy is compared to others.
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